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Comments
PEN REGISTER EVIDENCE WITH ONE-PARTY
CONSENT:' SHOULD IT BE ADMISSIBLE?
A councilman and his wife received harassing telephone calls that
were in violation of New York law.2 They reported the incidents to
the police and were eventually able to suggest that Mr. Green might
be the offending caller. After contacting the telephone company
for assistance, the police were told about the pen register, a device
which could be placed on a phone line and identify every number
dialed from that phone. It could not record speech, indicate wheth-
er the call was answered or identify the telephone numbers of
incoming callers. The police installed the pen register on Green's
line after receiving the councilman's consent. It was readily con-
firmed that Green's phone was being used to make the calls as the
pen register recorded thirty-five calls from his phone to the coun-
cilman's in a single day. At Green's trial his attorney moved to
suppress this evidence. Held, motion denied: Since one party had
consented to the tap and alternately, since the phone company had
1. The term one-party consent or consent of one party as used in this
comment will refer to the factual situation where one party consents to
having his phone conversation with another monitored and information so
gained is used, in court, against the other party.
2. N.Y. PAL LAw § 240.30 (McKinney 1965) is violated when-
ever harassing calls are made, even if no conversation takes place.
March 1971 Vol. 8 No. 2
done the actual installing of the pen registers the information ob-
tained was admissible as evidence. People v. Green, 63 Misc. 2d
435, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (Crim. Ct. of City of NY, Kings County 1970).
Consent of one party to a communication has been held to elimi-
nate the need for a warrant when tapping phones.4 This comment
will examine the consent doctrine under the laws of New York, the
federal statutes and the United States Constitution. It will attempt
to determine whether one person who has some communication
with another can consent to having all the communications of the
other monitored and, indeed, whether one-party consent is still a
valid constitutional consideration.
STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ON CONSENT
In regard to the consent of one party legalizing a tap without a
warrant, the laws of New York5 are not materially different from
the federal laws.6 Both allow a tap when one party consents to
the overhearing of his communication with another. 7 Evidence
gained in this way is admissible in any trial or proceeding.8 No
evidence obtained in violation of the federal wiretap statutes is ad-
missible in any state or federal court.9 Since the federal statutes
are more stringent than New York laws, an independent discussion
of the laws of New York is not relevant.
It is well settled that the pen register intercepts a communica-
tion.10 It has been argued that persons could communicate by
3. This alternate holding will not be discussed. Let it suffice to say
that since there was a clear police involvement the holding is not well
founded. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Harmon v. Com-
monwealth, 209 Va. 574, 166 S.E.2d 232 (1969).
4. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Wilson v. United
States, 316 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1963); People v. Bates, 163 Cal. App. 2d 847,
330 P.2d 102 (1958).
5. N.Y. CODE OF CRAM. PROCEDURE §§ 813 J-M (McKinney Supp. 1970).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. V 1968); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. V 1968).
7. See N.Y. CODE OF CraM. PROCEDURE § 813 J(1) (McKinney Supp.
1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2) (c), (d) (Supp. V 1968). Calif. law concerning
police interception and use of communications is also substantially the same.
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 633 (West 1970).
8. Not all states have adopted this law. See People v. Kurth, 34 IlM. 2d
387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966) (holding that no wiretap evidence can be used
against a non-consenting party).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Supp. V 1968); see Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378
(1968).
10. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1966); Huff v.
Mich. Bell Telephone Co., 278 F. Supp. 76, 77 (E.D. Mich. 1967); United
States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 808 (S.D. Mich. 1966); People v. Green,
63 Misc. 2d 435, 312 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (Crim. Ct. 1970). Contra, People v.
Schneider, 45 Misc. 2d 680, 257 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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allowing the phone to ring a specified number of times and thereby
convey a message without the recipient even lifting the re-
ceiver.'1 While this is possible, the more rational logic would be
that a telephone is so tied up with communication that any tam-
pering with it will adversely affect communication. The Omnibus
Crime Control Act 1 2 has adopted those views and prohibits the il-
legal interception of any information identifying the parties to the
communication. 13 Thus, evidence obtained by the unconsented to
use of a pen register without a warrant is clearly inadmissible.'
4
The question then becomes whether consent of one party removes
the need for a warrant.
The federal authorization for a tap with one-party consent is pri-
marily based on Rathbun v. United States.'5 There, where one
party voluntarily allowed a police officer to listen in on his pre-
existing extension phone, the evidence obtained against the other
party was held admissible. This holding was based on the princi-
ples that one party takes a risk that the other party will betray
him,' 6 and also that without clear congressional intent, there may
be no interference with the normal use of a phone extension.'
7 It
was but a short step from Rathbun to allowing the use of specially
installed extensions, electrical and mechanical devices' 8 and re-
corders' 9 with one-party consent.20 This is the present state of
federal law2 1 and few cases have objected.22 The use of the pen
11. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 808 (S.D. Mich. 1966).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. V, 1968).
13. Id. § 2510 (8).
14. United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 536 (N.D. I1. 1965),
af'd sub nom. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); see
United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Mich. 1966).
15. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
16. Id. at 111; United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 845-47, n.7 845 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. granted 394 U.S. 957 (1969); People v. Jones, 254 Cal. App.
2d 200, 62 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967).
17. 355 U.S. at 109-10.
18. See Wilson v. United States, 316 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1963).
19. See id.; Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1967).
20. See State v. Hulsey, 15 Ohio App. 2d 153, 239 N.E.2d 567, 570 (1968).
21. See §§ 18 U.S.C. 2511(2) (c), (d) (Supp. V 1968) (saying consent
makes the interception legal, without mentioning the means used).
22. But see Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 381 (1968); United States v.
White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888,
889 (2d Cir. 1940) (decided prior to Rathbun); United States v. Jones,
register with this kind of consent has been unflinchingly approved.23
But should it be? The interception of calls to the consenting party
is clearly legal, but it will be a rare instance where the pen register
does not record a call to a non-consenting party. It is these calls
that cause difficulty. Unless they fit into some exception of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 196824 their unwarranted intercep-
tion is clearly illegal. The question of admissibility of calls to
consenting parties becomes one of policy, that is, whether the
legally intercepted calls may be used even though their intercep-
tion requires the illegal interception of other calls. Justice Bran-
deis has aptly said:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government of-
ficials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set
its face.25
It thus becomes necessary to balance Brandeis' principle against
the need to capture criminals.
Public policy may seek to exclude legal pen register evidence in
order to discourage the accompanying illegal interceptions; 20 how-
ever, where the fruits of an illegal search may be separated from
those of a legal search, the untainted fruits are admissible.7 Their
exclusion is not required by the present federal laws. There does
not appear to be a case decided under these federal laws which ex-
cludes fruits of the consented-to-use of a pen register.
292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D.D.C. 1988); Barber v. State, 172 So. 2d 857 (Fla.
1965) (Rawls, J., dissenting).
23. See State v. Hulsey, 15 Ohio App. 2d 153, 239 N.E.2d 567 (1968); Har-
mon v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 574, 166 S.E.2d 232 (1969).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2) (a) - (d), (3) (Supp. V 1968) (exceptions to cov-
erage of act); see text accompanying notes 31-38 infra.
25. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. V 1968) would be the section violated.
27. See United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 808 (S.D. Mich. 1966).
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REASONS BESIDES CONSENT FOR ADMITTING PEN
REGISTER EVIDENCE: EXCEPTIONS TO THE O1VMNIBUS
CRnma CONTROL ACT
It has been argued that where a communication device is being
illegally used, the user has no right to privacy under federal law.
28
However, if this principle is explored one discovers that it generally
applies only where any communication via the particular means
would be illegal. It does not apply where the nature of the com-
munication makes the call illegal.29 Thus, the telephone company
may tap a line to see if unauthorized long distance calls are being
made or to see if they are being otherwise cheated; but not for any
other purpose.
8 0
Some courts have held that the pen register is used in the nor-
mal course of telephone company business8 1 and as such is author-
ized by the Omnibus Crime Control Act.32 Each year over three-
quarters of a million harassing calls are made33 and if the phone sys-
tem is to be protected from this abuse some form of detection device
is needed.34 That the pen register is normally used in this way is
not, however, clear. It would only be useful where the harassed
party has a fair idea of the caller's identity. A more normal use of
the register would be to determine if a home phone was being used
to conduct a business,3 5 to check for a defective dial 6 or for overbill-
ing.37 The admissibility of records, which are ordinarily kept for all
long distance calls, has thus been distinguished from " the manipu-
28. United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Hanna, 260 F. Supp. 430, 433 (S.D. Fla. 1966); State v. Holliday,
169 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 1969); Commonwealth v. Voci, 185 Pa. Super.
563, 138 A.2d 232, 233 (1958).
29. United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1955); Huff v.
Mich. Bell Telephone Co., 278 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. Mich. 1967); United
States v. Hanna, 260 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Fla. 1966). See also State v. Holli-
day, 169 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1969) (the reasoning goes beyond the illegal
act theory).
30. Huff v. Mich. Bell Telephone Co., 278 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. Mch.
1967).
31. State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 778-79 (Iowa 1969).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (5)- (5) (a) (ii) (Supp. V 1968).
33. State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 1969).
34. See State v. Coleman, 270 N.C. 357, 154 S.E.2d 485, 491 (1967).
35. See Schmukler v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213, 116
N.E.2d 819 (Common Pleas 1953).
36. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966).
37. Id.
lative use of a pen register .... ,38
THE CONSTrTioNAL ARGUMNT: CONSENT
It is now settled that an unreasonable wiretap is a search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment and as such is inad-
missible in any state or federal court.39 While Rathbun was an
interpretation of a federal wiretap statute,40 it has been considered
the constitutional limit as well. Thus, wiretaps with one-party con-
sent have been considered constitutional. 41 The recent case of
Katz v. United States4 2 may have gone far towards eradicating this
well established consent doctrine.
The main import of Katz was to end the need for a trespass in
order to find a fourth amendment violation in regard to wiretap.
The Court said the fourth amendment protects people, not places;
whatever a person seeks to keep private, even in a public place,
may be protected.4 3 The requirements are a subjective and reason-
able expectancy of privacy.44 It is significant that Katz makes no
mention of one-party consent as a possible exception to the doc-
trine that all searches must be under prior judicial control in order
to be constitutional. 45 The fourth amendment would become il-
lusory if such a meaningless form of consent could strip a person of
his rights,46 and if the amendment is to remain viable, one party
must not be able to waive the rights of another.47 The distinction
between third-party monitoring and monitoring with one-party
consent has been eliminated by Katz, 45 and only a judge can au-
thorize such an infringement of a person's rights.4  Except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, a warrant must be obtained.0
The fourth amendment should be judiciously protected lest it
38. United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 542 (2nd Cir. 1969).
39. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652 § 605, 48 Stat. 1103-04.
41. People v. Jones, 254 Cal. App. 2d 200, 62 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967).
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43. Id. at 351-53.
44. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1007-08 (D.D.C. 1968).
46. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1969).
47. See id.; United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D.D.C. 1968).
48. United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D.D.C. 1968); United
States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1969).
49. United States v. Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D.D.C. 1968).
50. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 380 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
This case was decided before Katz and is independent of it. Note that
even after Katz a person will not always have a reasonable expectation
of privacy while using a phone; see United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 845
(7th Cir. 1969).
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be wiled away. With the increase in our population and the re-
sulting decrease in space, the constitutional right of privacy is more
necessary than ever.51 The technological advances in eavesdrop-
ping equipment raise many important questions. "The answers
we find will determine whether Americans in the last part of the
twentieth century will be free or craven, independent or guarded."52
It is but a short step from efficient law enforcement to a police
state where human rights are crushed.
53
Ev= IF CONSENT IS VALID, Is THE PEN REGISTER?
Even if Katz were held not to apply and Rathbun was given full
force, the pen register would still not meet constitutional muster.
The conduct authorized by Rathbun was extremely limited.54 It
was only after many steps had been taken by lower courts that
Rathbun was expanded into today's consent doctrine.55
The use of any recording device or mechanical aid could be
enough to remove an eavesdrop from Rathbun's protection.5"
Lee v. Florida57 recently held that evidence must be suppressed
where police were somehow placed on a party line with the defen-
dant and obtained evidence against him. Equal emphasis was put
on the lack of consent and the fact that this extension was installed
for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence and was not in previous
ordinary use. In its holding the Court said that this interception
was a far cry from the conduct authorized by Rathbun.58
The use of a pen register is also a far cry from the conduct in
Rathbun. The sole purpose of the pen register in such a case is the
detection of criminal activity; it is installed especially for this pur-
pose and it is not a normal piece of equipment at the consenting
party's residence. In Ratbun and most of the cases interpreting it,
51. Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Ky. 1962) (More-
men, J., dissenting).
52. SENATOR E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS viii (1967) (foreword by Vice Presi-
dent Hubert H. Humphrey).
53. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955); see
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
54. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
55. See cases cited notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
56. Barber v. State, 172 So. 2d 857, 862 (Fla. 1965) (Rawls, J., dissent-
ing).
57. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
58. Id. at 381.
the only communication intercepted was the communication to the
consenting party. Not so with the pen register. It intercepts every
call made by the suspect and thus lays bare more information
about more people than was ever contemplated by Rathbun.
COULD A WARRAxT AuTHOPIZE A Pm RGISTEm IN A
H Assm T CASE?
Even if the pen register was used with a warrant 0 the resulting
evidence may not be admissible. In an ordinary warrant situation
each call is important. A narcotics dealer could make a relevant
statement, or attempt a sale in any call he makes or receives.
Where, however, a person is suspected of making harassing calls
to a single party, calls to other persons are irrelevant. Allowing the
monitoring of all calls in such a situation resembles the general
search feared by the framers of our Constitution.0 o Generally,
when conducting a search, any evidence lawfully obtained will be
admissible, but the area of the search is limited by the item
sought.61 Thus a desk drawer could not be opened when the war-
rant is for the seizure of a car. Likewise if the telephone number
of the complaint began with 276, it would be unnecessary to record
any number the defendant calls beginning with 583. If possible, the
pen register should be altered so as not to record past this point.
Such an alteration would limit objections to the use of a pen regis-
ter with a warrant.
If possible the pen register should be modified, however, prac-
tically speaking, if it cannot be altered it should be allowed. The
protections afforded by a warrant will be sufficient to protect the
great majority of citizens. 6 2 If no device could be produced that
was more selective in its recording than the pen register,6 its ex-
clusion would be absurd. It would be akin to saying that no paper
can be seized because others must be read in order to find the one
specified by the warrant. In wiretapping the scope of investigation
59. This may not be possible in a harassment case since under the pres-
ent federal statute only certain crimes qualify for a warranted tap; see 18
U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. V 1968). There would be a strong argument to modify
this requirement in harassment cases, i.e. a need exists to capture these
persons and a warrant affords more protection than one-party consent.
60. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480-81 (1965).
61. Lafave, Search And Seizure: "The Course Of True Law ... Has
Not ... Run Smooth" 1966 U. OF ILL. L.F. 255, 274-75, 274, n.128.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. V 1968).
63. There is a device, aptly called a trap, which automatically traces
any call made to a harrassed person from within his own exchange group.
While this device is still limited in the area in which it is effective, it
should still be very useful.
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should be the narrowest possible that will still satisfy the require-
ments of the search. There is no need for more stringent require-
ments if a warrant must be previously obtained.
The fourth amendment can be rationally expanded to exclude
pen register evidence obtained with a warrant. If the admissibility
of evidence obtained with the protections of a warrant is question-
able, its use without a warrant should clearly be unreasonable
and the evidence inadmissible.
TIE FIRST AmExDmENT
The first amendment is an important consideration when dealing
with wiretapping.64 Throughout the history of the Bill of Rights,
the first, fourth and fifth amendments have been inseparably
tied.65
A citizen should have the right to use his phone freely without
the inhibition that would be necessarily present if he feared his
calls were being monitored. In normal circumstances a party can
be relatively certain his phone is not being tapped unless there is
probable cause to suspect him of serious crime, or the receiver of his
call is allowing another party to listen in. He can effectively guard
against both of these contingencies by not associating with crime
and by being careful around persons he does not trust. If the pen
register continues to be installed without a warrant upon the con-
sent of any party who complains to the police, the assurances of
privacy will dwindle. It will no longer take probable cause to
tap a phone but only a hunch of a spiteful neighbor.
While an ordinary tap could affect what we say,66 the pen regis-
ter could even affect who we are willing to call. It is all too easy to
dismiss the pen register as a harmless device which cannot record
conversations. 7 However, sometimes it could be more dangerous
than a full tap. Great damage could be caused by the pen register
where an innocent call is made to a suspicious person, where a
64. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 845 r.8 (7th Cir. 1969).
65. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
66. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem In Wiretapping & Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversa-
tion, 68 CoLum. L. REV. 189, 216-17 (1968).
67. See People v. Schneider, 45 Misc. 2d 680, 257 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
wrong number is dialed, 68 or where some third party is using the
suspect's phone for an illegal purpose.6 9 Since these dangers, if
widespread, could inhibit the ordinary use of the phone, their cause
should be eliminated. If it becomes necessary to use the exclu-
sionary rule70 to maintain free speech, that should be done.
Some will never be convinced that the pen register in and of it-
self is important or dangerous. Those persons should realize that
even if the device is meaningless, the legal theory which allows
its use could be devastating. They should once again allow Bran-
deis to set the mood:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intel-
lect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence
in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion
must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.71
CONCLUSION
The pen register is a deceptively simple device, but its use, with-
out a warrant, can pierce the hearts of the first, fourth and fifth
amendments. Even if one-party consent is still a constitutionally
valid consideration it cannot be expanded to authorize the use of
the pen register.
ANTHONY WETHERBEE
68. See State v. Hulsey, 15 Ohio App. 2d 153, 239 N.E.2d 567 (1968).
69. See Carswell v. S.W. Bell, 449 S.W.2d 805, 813-14, 816 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1969); Jarvis v. S.W. Bell, 432 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Cit. Civ. App.).
70. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1968); People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 912-13 (1955).
71. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
